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It is important to correct some of the
impressions that may have been created by
Mr. Allen in his last issue of Studies in
Design Education and Craft 9.1.
Specifically I want to examine the Peters'
analysis of education and the Hirst account
of liberal education with reference to the
place of craft education in the curriculum. I
will maintain that an acceptance of the
Peters-Hirst theses is perfectly consistent
with an emphasis on craft education.
Mr. Allen is worried about the Peters'
criterion of 'cognitive perspective' as a neces-
sary condition of 'being educated'. He thinks
it provides a wrong emphasis in craft or
excludes it from a justifiable position in the
curriculum. Let us see what Peters actually
says about craft. His phrase is that being
educated in craft implies at least having
'some depth of understanding in carpentry
not just a know-how". His point seems to
be that one could hardly be said to be
educated as a craftsman or as anything else if
one could only follow instructions or display
some knack - however important these
things are. Indeed one could hardly be said
to be a craftsman at all unless one had some
idea of the whys and wherefores of craft
processes, some grasp of relevant scientific
and technological information and principles,
as well as a knowledge of design and some
aesthetic feeling for materials and product.
To be educated in craft involves more than
being trained to copy the master's demon-
stration or design - although this may be a
necessary stage in the development of crafts-
manship - it is to be able to display
autonomy and relate appropriate, relevant
facts or principles to the problem at hand.
The kind of know-how aimed at is informed
or principled know-how, the ability to
generalise from the particular tasks upon
which one has been engaged, the craft 'jobs'
or projects upon which one has been
working, to other situations on which one
has not yet been involved. In short both the
skilled and educated craftsman must display
certain kinds of informed judgments. The
educated carpenter has however more than
skills in this sense: 'his understanding and
sensitivities would have to be not limited to
carpentry'2. In Peter's phrase, he cannot just
be a narrow specialist, he must possess cog-
nitive perspective'.
Now Mr. Allen seems to think that
'cognitive perspective' must involve a depth
and breadth study of the academic discip-
lines and therefore is beyond all but the
university student. But that is not what
Peters says. For example I:'e writes that
vocational training 'can be used as an urgent
centre of interest around which cognitive
perspective can be developed'.3 Elsewhere
he suggests three ways whereby craft could
be liberalised, thus providing a focal point
for a Iiberal education; 1) one cou Id stress
the intrinsic standards involved in the
activities; 2) one could use the practical
activity as a centre of interest from which
people could be .encouraged to develop an
interest in wider areas of knowledge that
were relevant to the practice of them (e.g.
sciences, art, history or furniture and tech-
nology); 3) one could encourage the
students to be more searching and critical
about what they were taught (e.g. critically
analysing designs, having first mastered the
principles of what has to be taken into
account in designing)4. It must be clear to
any fair-minded reader that Peters is
sympathetic towards and cognizant of craft
teaching. Witness his stress on the need for
some sort of developmental study of craft
skills, and his recognition that 'a child may
del ight in a well-made boat who is unmoved
by a cogent argument'5.
Perhaps, however, one may argue that Mr.
Allen is more justified in attacking Paul
Hirst's account of liberal education. Mr.
Allen accuses Hirst of wrongly believing that
the Greek view of liberal education is based
solely on the nature of knowledge. He asks
whether it is possible that Hirst has read
Plato's Laws. Hirst is furthermore accused of
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291 classifying the arts and practical activities asanti-intellectual, though Mr. Allen has great
difficulty, so he tells us, in understanding
what Hirst actually says about the arts.
As becomes clear in his Encyclopedia of
Education article on liberal education,6 (not
mentioned by Mr. Allen), Hirst follows
tradition in basing h is view of liberal
education on the Aristotel ian account,7 as
an education which is neither vocational, nor
exclusively technological or scientific, nor
specialist. Hirst states that central to
Aristotle's advocacy of liberal studies was a
complex picture of human nature and the
importance he attached to the pursuits of
reason in the good life. He thought that the
greatest good of every existing thing was the
fulfilment of its fundamental or essential
function. For man this meant a life devoted
to the pursuit of excellence in intellectual
and moral activities.8 This seems to me to
have got Aristotle's views just right. But is
there a conflict here with the Platonic
account? In the image of the cave9 - Plato
argues that man becomes free by pursuing
those subjects such as arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy, harmonics and dialectic, which
he sees as concerned with grasping or
understanding Reality. For him, they are
important not for their practical use, but for
their concern with abstract ideas and know-
ledge which is not subject to the same
changes as our beliefs about the empirical
world. If one studies the subsequent stereo-
typing of the liberal arts in the writings of
Varro (116-27 Be) and St. Augustine (354·
430 AD) one sees how this Platonic view is
central to the tradition of liberal education.
It certainly does not appear to be contra-
dicted in the Laws or the Aristotelian
writings.
So much for Hirst's scholarship. But
doesn't Hirst display an intellectual arrogance
in the statement Mr. Allen quotes about
retreating 'into arts and practical activities'.1 0
Here a study of the context would indicate
that Hirst was applying the principle of
equality. If the arts and practical activities
are worthwhile pursuits, then they are
worthwhile for anyone not just the less able.
Their place is limited since they represent
only part of the curriculum and therefore
cannot act as a substitute for acquiring basic
skills of the use of language or of numbers.
But are they worthwhile? Do they lead to
the 'development of mind'? This is where
the problem occurs. One has to dig into
Hirst's theories to see what they signify for
the subject teacher, including the craft
teacher.
Briefly let me say that his main thesis
obviously owes much to the philosophies of
Kant and Wittgenstein. If I were to state a
modern view of the development of mind on
these lines it would go something like this:
We judge someone as possessing a mind in so
far as he possesses certain capacities, such as
the capacity to acquire intellectual abilities,
for example, the ability to operate with
symbols, to act intelligently and to choose
goals for oneself. The mind does not develop
from nothing. We possess certain primitive
capacities such as the ·abilities. to interpret
visual impressions spatially and all impres-
sions temporally, and the aptitude to
employ a causal principle. But certain social
experiences including the acquisition of
language are vital for the elaboration and
sophistication of these infantile capacities.
The acquisition of publicly agreed concepts
is absolutely essential for the effective use of
the mental powers per se. Though physical
processes may be involved when people
perceive, understand, doubt, believe etc,
these processes involve more than the
physiological elements. All these processes
have objects for which there are public
criteria for example, whatever object we
perceive is classified within some conceptual
framework. Whether or not what I see is a
chisel can be judged against a public agree-
ment about what is meant by a chisel. On
Hirst's account there are certain basic ways
by which we organise our experience and
knowledge (e.g. mathematically, scientifi-
cally, morally etc.) and these 'forms of
knowledge' are imbedded in language and in
the rule-governed ways we employ symbols.
A 'form of knowledge' is not an academic
discipline or school subject, since Inter-
Personal knowledge with its unique concepts
of action, intention, purpose etc, can be
found employed in History (Napoleon's
intention), the Social Sciences (human pur-
poses), or in ordinary experience (my
intention), It is experience which gives
content to these basic distinctions in know-
ledge. Hence the mind develops in a dialec-
tical relationship with the various objects of
experience, and the objectivity of knowledge
is guaranteed by the tests of truth that can
be applied in this relationship. It is possible
that had we inhabited different worlds or
had we possessed different sense organs we
might have de'Jeloped different forms of
knowledge. However the distinctions in
existing knowledge are supported by the
objective tests we employ against our back-
ground of inter-personal agreement about
the use of symbols. We learn the meaning
of the various symbolic systems of
knowledge against a background of social
activity and practice. Hence learning a form
of knowledge is not as Mr. Allen thinks it is,
learning propositions per se. The religious
form of knowledge, therefore, is concerned
with the peculiar nature of religious
activities and their significance for human
beings: it is not Christian theology. The
meaning of, say, Beethoven's Ninth
Symphony is to be found in the music itself.
If Beethoven could have said what he meant
by the Ninth Symphony then he should have
published his work in words and not in
music. Human beings have developed a
number of basic ways by which they
organise their understanding, and for each of
these ways the objectives tests, whereby the
dross is separated from the pure product, are
unique. Thus we go about making mathe-
matical judgements in a way that is different
from the observational-experimental ways of
science.
What, then, has Hirst's theory to do with
subjects, and in particular with craft? Sub-
jects rarely involve the pure language game
of the 'forms of knowledge', Take the
subject of English, It involved the teaching of
the skills, at different levels, of reading,
writing and comprehension. It also involves
aesthetics - the teaching of literature and
drama" through acquaintance and criticism.
It may also involve some scientific element
of grammar and linguistics as well as some
element of Inter-Personal knowledge and
Morals. To break down the subject in this
way enables the English teacher to be clearer
about the problem of priorities, Mathematics,
on the other hand, as taught in its various
methods in school, comes nearer to repre-
senting a pure 'form of knowledge', though
Fletcher work and Piaget type experiments
go beyond the basis of pure mathematics to
some understanding of the empirical world.
Hirst's point is that teachers and pupils alike
need to be able to recognise the distinctive
nature of the language games implied in the
forms of knowledge, including the ways
whereby the statements can be verified or
not. (It is for this reason that theology could
never be a form of knowledge).
What then are the implications of this
analysis for craft? Obviously it depends
upon what is meant by 'craft', In its
traditional sense it implied performed skilled
operations upon some raw or unworked
material (e.g. metal, wood) to produce
something that could be judged functionally
(e.g. a chair is an object used for some
particular purpose i.e. sitting of some sort),
The designing element could be regarded
separately from the productive element,
though the functional .element may be
judged on aesthetic as well as purely
utilitarian considerations. This kind of
definition rules out wall papering and car
maintenance as strict crafts, and sees wood-
carving and sculpuring as arts. The school
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293 activity of Craft, however, covers more thanthe above analysis indicates, and the new
term 'Design Technology' is meant to draw
attention to the scientific-technological ele-
ment of problem-solving that is included
within the new activities. In none of these
senses can Craft or Design Technology be a
'form of knowledge'. It is not because it is
an inferior subject, since 'forms of know-
ledge' are not subjects at all. The point is
that the techniques, skills or know-how that
are central to the craft situation employ the
various contents and judgments that arise
out of the 'form of knowledge' distinction.
The skilled craftsman does not just have the
knack of performing physiological move-
ments. His actions can be judged scientifi-
cally ( in terms of what glues are used, joints
employed, materials worked upon etc),
aesthetically (in terms of the quality of
design), sociologically and historically (in
terms of the social practice or the history of
design). The craft teacher passes on these
judgments in demonstrating skills or in
organising problem-solving.
In case the kind of view I have considered
in the light of the Peters-Hirst analysis is
misunderstood, I would like to make certain
points clear. This is not an advocacy of
lessons that are packed full of scientific and
aesthetic theory and little practical work. It
seems to be unwise to intellectualise the
practical work out of existence. The theory
has to go on within the practical work:
within the demonstration and instruction. It
is sought as a means of assisting the problem-
solving. Obviously the amount of theory and
the depth in which it is pursued, will depend
upon the capabilities of the pupils. In
general, the more the pupil is able to partici-
pate in complex projects, the more he will
require to explore related areas of knowledge.
What then is advocated is some awareness of
the kinds of judgment that need to be made
in Craft or Design Technology. It is a plea
for a realistic widening of the scope of
traditional crafts. I say 'realistic' because I
recognise two constraining factors: 1) pupil
interest and capability (successful education
involves a working with children, operating
within their socio-psychological set of
attitudes, in order to bring about improve-
ment); 2) teacher interest and specialised
knowledge (teachers obviously vary in the
degree of specialised knowledge and training
they have received). Both teacher and pupil
have their limitations but we may have to
change both. The teacher may have to
increase his technological skills and know-
ledge; the pupil may have to be more
informed about the underlying principles of
the processes in which he is engaged. But
that, says Peters, is what education means: a
change for the better.
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